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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ANSWERED "YES" to the $1.45
million over-exaction question for 1999. In City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 1 a unanimous court extended the scope
of compensatory takings review beyond land dedication conditions into
the realm of regulatory denial. Justice Kennedy's opinion vitalized the
"legitimate state interests" test from Agins v. City ofTiburon2 to sustain
an inverse condemnation conclusion and damage award to the frustrated developer. 3 A majority of the court also concurred that the trial
court may delegate this takings conclusion to the jury under federal
civil rights law. 4 The activation of Agins' substantive takings test in
such challenges and the prospect of continued lay application of con1.
2.
3.
4.
ring),

_U.S. _; 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
447 u.s. 255, 260 (1980).
119 S. Ct. at 1645.
!d. at 1642-45 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concur1645-50 (Scalia, J. concurring in result).
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stitutionallaw to development restrictions add uncertain dimensions to
exactions litigation at the millennium.
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court also distinguished the instant development denial of an inverse condemnation claim from the land dedication conditions at issue in Dolan v. City of Tigard. 5 This distinction
enabled the unanimous Court to uphold the trial verdict based on Agins
and avoid elements of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning invoking the Dolan
rough proportionality test. Other recent federal and state decisions also
decline to extend Dolan's applicability beyond individual land dedication development conditions to other forms of economic exactions.
This year's exactions and impact fee report focuses on Del Monte
Dunes, namely its effects on negotiated development, trial practice, and
on regulatory takings doctrine as defined by judges and juries in civil
rights litigation.
I. The Regulatory Exactions Issues Before the Supreme
Court in Del Monte Dunes

To provide a context for Del Monte Dunes regulatory takings issues,
this section reviews the local record and circumstances, the extended
litigation path through federal courts, and the Supreme Court's declarations regarding applicable facts and law.
A. The Local Record: Negotiation, Promises,

and Ultimate Frustration (1981-86)
The convoluted Monterey trail toward development denial winds from
a 1981 proposal for 344 units 6 through the city commission's rejection
of a 190-unit site plan in mid-1986. Following negotiations with planning staff over the original environmental impact report, the developer
resubmitted a revised tentative map and planned-unit development application for 264 units. 7 The planning commission rejected this application in December 1983. 8 At that time, staff indicated that a 224-unit
development would be more favorably considered.9 On appeal to the
city council in March 1984, the "suggested" number was reduced to
190, including a series of conditions, which the city. council approved
5. /d. at 1635. See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
6. This initial plan's density was well within the permitted 1,000-unit zoning standards. 119 S. Ct. at 1632. See also Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd. v. City of
Monterey (II), 95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.
v. City of Monterey (1), 920 F.2d 1496, 1501-07 (9th Cir. 1990).
7. 119S.Ct.atl632.
8. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey/, 920 F.2d at 1502.
9. !d.
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as a concept plan. 10 In January 1986, the planning commission ignored
staff recommendations to approve this resubmitted Tentative Subdivision Map. 11 The city commission affirmed this denial in June 1986,
citing environmental impact on the dunes, effect on vegetation and
habitat for the Smith's Blue Butterfly, and adequate accessP
As noted in the Supreme Court's recitation of facts, the 37 .6-acre
coastal property was far from pristine. The site had been used for many
years as an oil company terminal and tank farm. 13 Its vegetation was
nearly one-fourth covered by invasive non-native ice plant (used for
erosion control), which without intervention would be expected to overtake the diminishing natural buckwheat habitat of the Smith's Blue
Butterfly. 14 This unflattering description of the pre-application site and
repeated re-negotiations of the site plan established a local record open
to question on good faith, fair treatment, and regulatory takings bases.
B. The Judicial Record in Del Monte Dunes
( 1986 to 1999)
After rejection of the revised 190-unit subdivision plan, the developer
initiated a thirteen-year course through federal courts culminating in
the May 24, 1999, Supreme Court decision. The original civil rights
action in federal district court was dismissed, then remanded for trial
on appeal by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990. 15 At the
subsequent trial, the judge instructed the jury to evaluate the merits of
the § 1983 takings claim and to determine a damage award. 16 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed this verdict in 1996, applying the rough proportionality
test from Dolan v. City of Tigard. 17
At the remanded trial, the plaintiff land developer successfully
brought a § 1983 action against the City of Monterey and recovered a
jury award of $1.45 million in damages. 18 The trial judge sent the inverse condemnation or takings question to the federal jury to be ana10. Nearly half of the negotiated 190-unit plan for the 37.6-acre site was devoted
to public open space; 7.9 additional acres to open landscaped areas, and only 5.1 acres
to buildings. 119 S. Ct. at 1632. The 17.9 acres for open space included a public beach
and areas for the restoration of the buckwheat habitat.
11. 119 S. Ct. at 1632.
12. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey I, 920 F.2d at 1504-05.
13. Tank pads, pieces of pipe, broken concrete, oil-soaked sand, trash, and a sewer
line housed in 15-foot man-made dunes were present on the site. Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1631; Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey/, 920 F.2d at 1499.
14. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
15. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey I, 920 F.2d at 1508.
16. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1422, 1425.
17. /d. at 1429-30.
18. 119 S. Ct. at 1634.
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lyzed under the two-prong Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
takings test. 19 This was the same test recognized by the Supreme Court
in Agins. The unchallenged jury instructions referenced environmental
protection, open space agricultural protection, "protecting the health
and safety of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community
by looking at development" as illustrations of legitimate public purposes.20 The trial judge stated further: "So one of your jobs as jurors is
to decide if the city's decision here substantially advanced any such
legitimate public purpose." 21 The instructions then specified the legal
standard as a reasonable relationship between the city's decision and
the regulatory purpose. 22 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
without specifying the grounds for its decision. 23
On appeal of this jury verdict, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed two issues: whether the takings issue was properly before
the jury, and whether the evidence supported the finding that the city
had affected a taking under the Nollan (Agins) test. 24 On the first question, the court concluded that the takings issue was properly before the
jury as either a factual question or a mixed question of fact and law. 25
This holding placed the jury in the position of determining whether the
regulatory action of the city "advances a legitimate public purpose"
with the ultimate question being whether these actions-the plan denials-bear a "reasonable relationship" to these public purposes. 26 The
consequence of the jury's finding in the negative on this question was
that the city had taken the plaintiff's property.
Regarding the second issue, the Ninth Circuit examined the adequacy
of the evidence supporting the jury's positive finding and found that
19. Under the dual takings test, Del Monte had to show that the city's actions either
(1) did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose or (2) denied it economically viable use of its property. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). Usually said to
have been articulated in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the two-prong test has
been repeated in a number of subsequent Supreme Court decisions including Nollan,
Lucas, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes. Some commentators have objected to the transfer
of the Nectow/Euclid substantive due process test into the Agins takings formulation,
but it has persisted in the Supreme Court jurisprudence. See J. JUERGENSMEYER &
T. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 427-28 (1998).
20. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1634.
21. Id.
22. !d.
23. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1425; Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1634.
24. 95 F.3d at 1426.
25. ld. at 1429-30. The Supreme Court would later affirm and concur with this
characterization of the takings question. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119
S. Ct. at 1643-44.
26. 95 F.3d at 1429.
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Del Monte Dunes had provided sufficient evidence to rebut each of the
six reasons given by the city to justify its permit denials. 27 Curiously,
Judge Wallace's opinion added an interpretive wrinkle that combined
the "substantially advances legitimate state interests" takings test of
Nollan with the rough proportionality requirement derived from Dolan. 28 He stated that even if the city had legitimate reasons for denying
the permits, "its action must be 'roughly proportional' to furthering that
interest."29 The court conceded that the city's stated interests for its
denials were "legitimate" in a traditional substantive due process sense,
but that there needed to be a correlation between the permit denial and
the nature and extent of the impact of the proposed development. In
reviewing the evidence, Judge Wallace concluded that Del Monte
Dunes had sufficiently rebutted the city's proposed reasons for denying
the permit with superior data or evidence of the city's inconsistent
positions regarding the project. 30
Although announcing a novel standard of review for local government land-use regulation, the court's approach seemed to maintain the
traditional allocation of the burden of proof on the challenger. This
intermediate decision also confirmed an evidentiary showing successfully attacking the city's development denial under a rational basis due
process standard. However, without any particular analysis, the court
concluded that "[s]ignificant evidence supports Del Monte's claim that
the City's actions were disproportional [sic] to both the nature and
extent of the impact of the proposed development." 31 This conclusion
suggests a willingness to extend the Dolan land-use exaction-based
rough proportionality rule to purely regulatory actions of government.
C. The Supreme Court Decisions
in Del Monte Dunes

On certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the verdict and damage
award. All justices agreed that the intermediate court's application of
the Dolan test was not essential to sustaining the trial court's delegation
of law. This consensus extended to reliance on a more substantive standard articulated in Agins, and restated in Nolan, that the decision be
27. Id. at 1431.
28. The City of Monterey's Supreme Court brief indicates that this argument was
not raised by the parties but rather sua sponte by the Ninth Circuit itself. See Brief for
the Petitioners, 1997 U.S. Briefs 1235, *43 n.10.
29. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1430.
30. Jd. at 1431.
31. Jd. at 1432.
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supportive of "legitimate state interests."32 However, only five justices
concurred on sustaining the trial court's delegation of the takings conclusion to the jury. 33 The unanimous Court provided a brief yet direct
rejection of the Ninth Circuit's position on whether the rough proportionality test applies to the denied development. It clarified that the
court had not extended applicability of the Dolan test beyond the special context of required land dedications as conditions for approving
development. 34 Justice Kennedy carefully added that this rule "was not
designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different
questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based
not on excessive exactions but on denial of development." 35 Rather, the
Court affirmed the Agins/Nollan test as the applicable standard.
The Supreme Court also critiqued the city commission's reasons for
denying the permit rather than specifying conditions for what would
be an approvable site plan:
The council did not base its decision on the landowners' failure to meet any of the
specific conditions earlier prescribed by the city. Rather, the council made general
findings that the landowners had not provided adequate access for the development
(even though the landowners had twice changed the specific access plans to comply
with the city's demands and maintained they could satisfy the city's new objections
32. The two-pronged test emanating from Justice Brennan's summary comments
in Penn Central quickly took on a life of its own and was expressed as general constitutional law theory in the 1981 case of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 257, 261
(1980). Argued as a case alleging that a zoning ordinance took the plaintiffs property
without just compensation, Justice Powell articulated the takings test in the following
terms: "The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking
if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land ...." 447 U.S. at 260. The inclusion of
the due process prong has been severely criticized by academic commentators. See,
e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 519 (2d ed. 1993), and JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 427-28 (West 1998). See also Michael J.
Davis & Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a
Final Homeland for the Due Process and Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REv. 393 (1989).
However, the Agins test has been consistently restated, without much analysis, in the
line of Supreme Court takings cases decided throughout the 1980s and 1990s. See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Ironically, substantive due process judicial
review of social and economic laws has become increasingly less frequent and usually
unsuccessful as the federal courts have been reluctant to revive the intrusive review
associated with the Lochner era. However, the substantive due process "takings" argument, with its recent Supreme Court approval, has found its way into modem landuse cases including the Del Monte Dunes litigation where it was central to the jury's
verdict that the city had taken the plaintiffs property.
33. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1642-45 (Kennedy, J.,
Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concurring), 1645-50 (Scalia, J., concurring
in result).
34. /d. at 1634.
35. /d. To reinforce this point, the unanimous portion of the opinion added that
the rough proportionality test of Dolan was "inapposite to a case such as this one." /d.
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if granted an extension), that the plan's layout would damage the environment (even
though the location of the development on the property was necessitated by the city's
demands for a public beach, view corridors, and a buffer zone next to the state park),
and that the plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith's Blue Butterfly (even though
the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve or restore buckwheat
habitat on almost half of the property, and even though only one larva had ever been
found on the property). 36
While Justice Kennedy did not specifically link these parenthetical rebuttals to the city's reasons for denial to the A gins standard, it is evident
that they could bolster a jury's determination that frustrated negotiations and the ultimate development denial could be found insufficiently
supportive of legitimate state interests.
When addressing the verdict finding a regulatory taking, the Supreme
Court selectively affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. Since the trial
court instructions did not mention proportionality, the high court
averted supporting the applicability of the Dolan test. 37 Rather, the
unanimous Court relied on the appellate conclusion that a reasonable
jury could find that a nexus was lacking between the development denial and the legitimate public interests of local land-use regulation. 38
Justice Kennedy's opinion stated further that it was not the city's general zoning powers, but rather the particular zoning decision that was
at issue. 39 A majority of the Court then concluded that the trial judge's
instructions correctly limited the jury's scope of inquiry to not "consider the reasonableness, per se, of the customized, ad hoc conditions
imposed on the property's development."
Rather, the jury was instructed to consider whether the city's denial of the final
proposal was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. Even with regard to
this issue, however, the jury was not given free rein to second-guess the city's landuse policies. Rather, the jury was instructed, in unmistakable terms, that the various
purposes asserted by the city were legitimate public interests.
The jury, furthermore, was not asked to evaluate the city's decision in isolation
but rather in context, and, in particular, in light of the tortuous and protracted history
of attempts to develop the property.
In short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to whether,
in light of all the history and the context of the case, the city's particular decision
to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was reasonably related to the
city's proffered justifications. This question was couched, moreover, in an instruction
that had been proposed in essence by the city, and as to which the city made no
objection. 40
36. /d. at 1633 (emphasis added).
37. /d. at 1635.
38. 119 S. Ct. at 1635.
39. /d.
40. /d. at 1636-37 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court majority also referenced
a trial statement from developer's counsel:
Del Monte Dunes partnership did not file this lawsuit because they were complaining
about giving the public the beach, keeping it [the development] out of the view shed,
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These validated instructions provide conflicting messages: the matter
is confined first to the specific municipal decision to deny the development; however, this ultimate denial may be linked to the entire record
of city-developer interactions. With these dual directives, the jury could
reason a regulatory takings conclusion incorporating substantive inquiry into the fairness of the entire development review process.
II. Nollan/Dolan Decisions Continue to Limit Rough
Proportionality to Land Use

Decisions through mid-1999 continue to limit Nollan and Dolan's applicability to land-use exactions. A follow-up Eighth Circuit federal
appeals decision reaffirmed Dolan's applicability to a mandatory land
dedication condition for road improvements. Two Washington appellate
decisions apply high scrutiny to onsite and offsite road exactions. The
Maine Supreme Court applied this two-part test with greater deference
to local decision-making, while California's Landgate decision found
the test inapplicable to coastal development permit denial. Other recent
cases reinforce Dolan's limitation to physical dedications, and therefore
inapplicable to economic exactions in the contexts of relocation assistance exactions and rent control.
A. Dolan Rough Proportionality Applied

to Conditional Development Approvals
In its second review of a case remanded for application of the Dolan
test, 41 the federal Eighth Circuit sustained the district court's conclusion
that the city failed to sustain its burden to show rough proportionality.
In Goss v. City of Little Rock (II), 42 the city had denied a commercial
rezoning application when the property owner refused to accept a required dedication of 22 percent of his land for expansion of an adjacent
highway. 43 In the remanded trial, the district court concluded that a
taking occurred due to the government's failure to make an "individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and scope to the proposed development. " 44
devoting and [giving] to the State all this habitat area. One-third [of the] property is
going to be given away for the public use forever. That's not what we filed the
lawsuit about (conceding that the city may "ask an owner to give away a third of
the property without getting a dime in compensation for it and providing parking
lots for the public and habitats for the butterfly, and boardwalks").
119 S. Ct. at 1636 (citations omitted).
41. See Goss v. Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1996).
42. 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
43. !d. at 862.
44. !d. (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391).
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The Eighth Circuit sustained the trial court holdings that: the city did
meet the Nolan nexus requirement based on its interest in preventing
increased traffic that could result from commercial use, 45 but did not
sufficiently prove a rough proportionality between the dedication and
speculative traffic impacts. 46 The appellate court also dismissed a substantive due process claim as irrelevant to the takings issue, 47 and sustained the district court's denial of compensatory damages. 48 However,
it reversed the district court's remedy commanding a rezoning without
the required dedication, 49 and enabled a partial award of attorney fees
commensurate with the property owner's limited success in litigation. 50
Ironically, the court notes that the city could deny the rezoning outright,
i.e., without the dedication condition. 5 1 Since Goss II pre-dates the Supreme Court's Del Monte Dunes decision, future denials or conditions
could be affected by evolving takings doctrine and potential jury determination of appropriate remedies.
Two Washington Division Two Court of Appeals decisions apply
substantial detail to invalidate development conditions. Burton v. Clark
County5 2 found that the county had not sustained its burden of proof
under Dolan in conditioning approval of a three-lot short plat on dedicating a right-of-way and building a road, curbs, and sidewalks. While
the court accepted the legitimate governmental purpose for street connectivity within the county, 53 it found that the record lacked a basis for
inferring that the exacted road would connect to a nearby avenue in the
foreseeable future. Thus, the county had failed in its burden to show
that the exaction would solve or even alleviate the traffic problems it
identified. 54
45. /d. at 863.
46. The city's witness referred to traffic impacts that could "conceivably" be generated if a strip mall were erected, but could not refer to any plans or reason to expect
one to be built. 151 F.3d at 863.
47. /d.
48. /d. at 864.
49. !d. at 863-64.
50. !d. at 864-66.
51. 151 F.3d at 864.
52. 958 P.2d 343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998),pet.for rev. denied, 978 P.2d 1097 (Wash.
1999).
.
53. !d. at 349.
54. The Burton court identified four elements in Nollan, Dolan, and Washington
courts:
First, when the government conditions a land-use permit, it must identify a public
problem or problems that the condition is designed to address .... Second, the government must show that the development for which a permit is sought will create or
exacerbate the identified public problem ....
Third, the government must show that its proposed condition or exaction (which
in plain terms is just the government's proposed solution to the identified public
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In Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 55 the city required
a proposed twenty-acre subdivision to pay for constructing half-street
improvements to an adjoining, but unconnected street. 56 The court rejected the defenses that Dolan would not apply because the ordinance
applied to all new subdivisions, 57 or that it involved a fee rather that
direct land dedication. 58 Both the town's and Benchmark's traffic studies concluded that traffic increases on this street would be rninimal.5 9
The appellate court concluded that the city's ordinance failed to meet
the requirement of rough proportionality because there was "no necessary correlation between the extent a development borders a street
and the extent to which residents of the development will actually use
the street."60
The Maine Supreme Court applied the two-part Nollan/Dolan test
less demandingly to sustain a subdivision approval condition requiring
a fire protection easement and construction of a fire pond. 61 Its review
of the record granted initial deference to the town's legislative program,
but noted that the rough proportionality standard cannot be satisfied by
a conclusory statement made by the government authority. 62 The court
then considered how the ordinance was applied to the property and held
problem) tends to solve, or at least to alleviate, the identified public problem. In
other words, the government must show a relationship ("nexus") between the proposed solution and the identified problem, and such relationship cannot exist unless
the proposed solution has a tendency to solve or alleviate the identified problem.
Fourth, the government must show that its proposed solution to the identified
public problem is "roughly proportional" to that part of the problem that is created
or exacerbated by the landowner's development.
When combined, these four propositions boil down to two relationships: a relationship between the project and the identified public problem, and a relationship
between the identified public problem and the proposed solution to that problem.
The required relationship between project and problem is shown by establishing the
first and second propositions set forth above, while the required relationship between
problem and solution is shown by establishing the third and fourth propositions set
forth above. The ultimate goal is to show that the proposed condition or exaction
(i.e., the proposed solution to an identified public problem) is reasonably related to
all or part of an identified public problem that arises from (i.e., is created or exacerbated by) the development project. Unless the government makes this showing, it
lacks a "legitimate state interest" or a "legitimate public purpose" in imposing the
condition or exaction.
/d. at 353-55.
55. 972 P.2d 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
56. /d. at 946.
57. Id. at 949.
58. /d. at 949-50. The court relied on the reasoning from the remanded California
decision in Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), on remand from Ehrlich
v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).
59. Benchmark v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d at 949.
60. /d.
61. Curtis v. South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 658-59 (Me. 1998).
62. /d. at 659.
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that a "more than sufficient proportionality exists between the fire protection demands created by the subdivision plan and the easement requirement designed to meet these demands." 63
In Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, 64 the California
Supreme Court held in a closely divided four-to-three decision that
Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to a temporary takings claim arising out
of a denial of a development permit. 65 The case involved denial of a
coastal development permit to build a single-family residence in the
City of Malibu. 66 These permits are required in addition to any municipal land-use approvals. 67 The commission denied the permit and an
application for a lot line adjustment upon the grounds of excessive
building height and grading. 68 The ultimate result for the landowner
was a two-year delay in the permit approval process. 69 The trial court
entered judgment in an inverse condemnation action in favor of the
plaintiff, and awarded damages in excess of $155,000. 70 The intermediate appellate court affirmed this judgment; but the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded to the trial court, with directions to grant the
commission's motion for summary judgment on the takings claim and
plaintiffs motion for summary adjudication. 71
Against this factual and procedural background, the Supreme Court
initially held that the commission's denial of the permit application
advanced legitimate governmental interests in minimizing erosion and
unsightly development in the coastal area. 72 In addition, the California
high court held that a legally erroneous decision of a government
agency during the development approval process does not result in the
sort of delay which constitutes a temporary taking. After conducting
an extensive survey of applicable law, the court concluded that a regulatory mistake resulting in delay does not, by itself, amount to a taking
of property. 73 In this case, the two-year time loss was characterized as
63. /d. at 660.
64. 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998).
65. /d. at 1198.
66. /d. at 1189-94.
67. /d. at 1198.
68. /d. at 1191-92.
69. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1193.
70. /d.
71. /d. at 1204.
72. /d. at 1191-92.
73. /d. at 1195-98. In reaching this decision, the California high court observed
that recent cases suggest that judicial review of governmental conditions imposed upon
development will be more deferential when "the conditions are simply restrictions on
land use" rather than "requirements that the property owner convey a portion of his
property" or "pay development fees imposed on a property owner on an individual and
discretionary basis." /d. at 1198-99.
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a "normal delay" 74 countenanced in First English Church v. Los Angeles
County. 75 Viewed within this perspective, the Supreme Court rejected
the application of Nollan and Ehrlich because the instant case neither
·embraced compulsory conveyances of land nor the imposition of individualized development fees. 76 Instead, the case involved the denial
of a permit without these kinds of exactions. 77
Consequently, Landgate indicates that Nollan/Dolan will be applied
in a California takings challenge only when the conditions of development approval encompass conveyances or monetary exactions, and
in the case of monetary exactions, they must be adjudicatively imposed,
instead of legislatively imposed. 78 Any other condition of development
approval will be viewed as a "land use restriction" which will cause a
regulatory taking only when the effect of the restriction is to deprive
the property owner of all economically viable, beneficial, or productive
use. 79 The Landgate case is also interesting from a Nollan/Dolan standpoint because the court held that the proper judicial inquiry is an objective one: whether there is a "sufficient connection" between the landuse regulation and a legitimate governmental purpose so that the former
may be said to substantially advance the latter. 80
B. Dolan Test Held Inapplicable to Non-Land Use
Economic Regulations
In Garneau v. City of Seattle, 81 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny standard of review does not
apply to facial taking claims against a Tenant Relocation Assistance
Ordinance. 82 Pursuant to Washington State's Growth Management Act,
the Seattle law required landlords to pay to displaced tenants the sum
of $1,000 upon demolition, substantial rehabilitation, change of use, or
restriction removal of low-income rental units located within the city. 83
Owners of rental units within the city brought a takings claim on the
ground that the forced relocation payment amounted to an unconstitu74. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1193-95.
75. 482 u.s. 304 (1987).
76. 953 P.2d at 1198-99.
77. !d. But see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234-35, 1255 (Nev. 1999) (interim damage awards for
building moratorium ordinances and continued staff development denials for the period
from 1981 through 1986).
78. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1198-99.
79. /d. at 1199.
80. /d.
81. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998).
82. !d. at 808-11.
83. /d. at 804.

LAND UsE, PLANNING AND ZONING LAW

843

tional exaction in violation of the Dolan standard of review. Plaintiffs'
argument was based on the $1 ,000 per tenant monetary exaction being
"not roughly proportional to the harm caused by their proposed redevelopment project."B4
Plaintiff property owners asserted both facial and as-applied regulatory takings claims grounded in the Nollan/Dolan analytical approach.85 The majority through Judge Brunetti initially concluded that
the Nollan/Dolan cases do not apply to a facial attack on a monetary
exaction ordinance. 86 Consequently, the majority affirmed the district
court's summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the Nollan/Dolan
cases did not apply to facial claims, only to as-applied claims; (2) the
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their as-applied claims; and (3) the
plaintiffs willfully refused to produce any evidence of economic impact.87 In a sober conclusion to this case, the majority observed that it
was forced to uphold the city's ordinance in large part because evidence
of economic impact of the ordinance was relevant to plaintiffs' takings
claims, yet the plaintiffs steadfastly refused to produce such evidence. 88
A concurring opinion decided that the Dolan case did not apply because
the owners did not put forth any argument that the ordinance dispossessed them of any property or impaired the development potential (or
84. /d. at 806. The plaintiffs also asserted claims based upon the Substantive Due
Process Clause; however, these claims were rejected summarily based upon Macri v.
King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997), because the Takings Clause provides
an explicit source of constitutional protection against the challenged governmental
conduct, in which case, a substantive due process claim under these circumstances is
no longer recognized by the Ninth Circuit as a matter of law. See also Armendariz v.
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), and Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868
(9th Cir. 1996), which manifest the law of the circuit that the Substantive Due Process
Clause may not be used as a substitute for a regulatory takings claim grounded in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. For discussion, see Michael C. Spata, Armendariz
v. Penman: The Ninth Circuit's Requiem for the Substantive Due Process Clause as
an Alternative to a Regulatory Takings Claim, 1997 CAL. ENVT'L. L. REP. 251, 25759 (Oct. 1997), cited in CURTIN's CALIFORNIA LAND USE PLANNING LAW 179 n.9
(18th ed. 1998).
85. Garneau, 147 F.3d at 805. Following the close of discovery and the submittal
of a lengthy stipulation of facts, the district court granted the city's motion for summary
judgment against the facial takings claims on the ground that the ordinance reasonably
related to a legitimate state interest. /d. at 806. The district court also dismissed the
substantive due process claims for relief. /d.
86. /d. at 806-07. The court reasoned that the nucleus of facts did not present a
categorical or per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1016 (1992), in which case, the multi-factor test announced in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), was applicable, which required,
in part, that the aggrieved party show the economic impact of the regulation and the
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.
/d. at 807.
87. Garneau, 147 F.3d at 807-13.
88. /d.
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value) of the property. 89 Interestingly, this opinion stated that the Dolan
analysis is better rooted in a substantive due process and equal protection analysis rather than a takings analysis. 90 Judge O'Scanlain dissented on the ground that the Nollan/Dolan cases should apply. 91
In Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (Santa Monica Rent
Control Board), 92 a divided California Supreme Court held that the
general application of a rent control ordinance to a particular individual
was not subject to the heightened scrutiny test articulated in the Nollan/Dolan decisions. 93 The plaintiff landlord sought an adjustment under a local rent control law for a twelve-unit apartment building. 94 Following administrative proceedings held pursuant to the local ordinance,
a hearing examiner issued a ruling allowing a modest rent increase. 95
The rent control board affirmed this ruling, and the landlord filed a
mandamus action and a complaint for inverse condemnation under the
United States and California Constitutions. 96
In its complaint, Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. contended that the application of the city's rent control law constituted a taking because the
application of the ordinance did not substantially advance its stated
goals to produce affordable housing for the poor and elderly. 97 The
plaintiff contended further that the ordinance did not substantially mitigate the purported social harm that would otherwise result from the
unregulated use of rental property because the ordinance's effect was
to reduce affordable rental housing rather than to increase its supply.
Based upon this reasoning, the plaintiff contended that, under the
heightened scrutiny test, the ordinance did not substantially advance its
stated purpose. 98 On appeal of the trial court's dismissal, the appellate
89. !d. at 819.
90. !d. at 819-21.
91. !d. at 813 (O'Scanlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). His dissenting view reasoned that under Nollan/Dolan: (1) the exactions were not roughly
proportional to the harm caused by the landlords; (2) the Supreme Court's vacating
and remanding of Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994), to the California
Supreme Court suggests that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test applies to monetary
exactions; and (3) the exaction was tantamount to a physical occupation because it
deprived the owners of their right to exclude the tenants. !d. at 813-17.
92. 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999). For discussion of Santa Monica Beach, Ltd., see
Daniel J. Curtin & M. Johanna Sherlin, California Supreme Court Rejects HigherScrutiny Standard for Takings Claim Based on Rent Control Law, Adopts "HandsOff'' Policy For Land Use Legislation, McCUTCHEN UPDATE (Jan. 8, 1999); Michael
M. Berger, Golden State of Confusion, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 28, 1999, at 4, col.2; and
Susannah T. French, Commentary-Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Claims of
Taking by Rent Control, 1999 CAL. ENVT'L. L. REP. 54 (Feb. 1999).
93. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1005-06.
94. /d. at 996.
95. /d.
96. !d. at 996-97.
97. !d. at 997.
98. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 997-98.
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court directed that the complaint for inverse condemnation be reinstated, and that the Nollan standard be applied to the city's rent control
law. 99 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted review, and held
that "the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard articulated in Notian and Dolan does not apply" to a rent control challenge. 100 Instead,
the standard of review for generally applicable rent control laws must
be at least as deferential as for generally applicable zoning laws and
other legislative land-use controls; and as such, the party challenging
rent control must show that the application of the law constitutes "an
arbitrary regulation of property rights." 101 The California high court
further stated that heightened scrutiny is more appropriate for adjudicatory decisions involving land dedications and development fees that
are imposed on an individualized basis. 102
A novelty in the Santa Monica takings challenge was that the landlord conceded the validity of the rent control ordinance adopted many
years earlier, but with the passage of time, the purposes of the ordinance
were not accomplished. After considering this factual paradigm, the
majority stated that there is no constitutional requirement that legislation substantially serve stated goals. 103 The majority concluded by saying that the plaintiff was still free to pursue its administrative mandamus claim on the grounds that the city exceeded its legal authority
under its local charter, and that the board's ruling deprived the plaintiff
of a fair return on investment. 104
A concurring opinion in the Santa Monica rent control as illegal
exactions challenge indicated that there were two questions raised by
the Nollan/Dolan cases which produced a great deal of uncertainty;
namely, (1) What is the meaning of the "substantially advance" test
outside the scope of Nollan/Dolan cases? and (2) Outside the Nollan/Dolan context, is a means-end test an appropriate measure of
whether a regulatory taking has occurred? 105 Although Justice Kennard
was inclined to interpret the "substantially advance" test as a "rational
relationship" test consistent with traditional substantive due process
analysis, she urged the United States Supreme Court to resolve these
questions when the next opportunity arises. 106

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

/d. at 998.
/d. at 1001.
/d.
/d. at 1001--02.
Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1004.
/d. at 1007.
/d. at 1008.
/d. at 1008--09.
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The dissenting opinions would find Nollan/Dolan applicable to rent
control. Justice Baxter strongly asserted that the trial court should have
been allowed to carry out its constitutionally mandated judicial obligation to determine, on the basis of evidence to be presented, whether
application of the Santa Monica ordinance has taken property from the
plaintiff without just compensation. 107 He concluded that the ordinance
in question forces owners of rental property to bear a public burden for
which the takings clause mandates just compensation under a Nollan/Dolan analytical framework. 108
Justice Chinn also criticized that the majority "inappropriately conftates takings jurisprudence with due process jurisprudence.... " 109 He
noted that even if the court was skeptical about plaintiff's ability to
prove its case, it should be given the chance to try without having to
prove a due process case when it initiated a takings case. 110 A dissenting
opinion by Justice Brown challenged the majority's assertion that the
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard articulated in Nollan/Dolan
did not apply as more "wish than fact." 111 She concluded by stating that
if rent control measures are capable of withstanding a Nollan-inspired
takings analysis, then the U.S. Supreme Court "ought to tell us so,
preferably sooner than later." 112
III. Impact Fee Case Law Update

In contrast to potential volatility in current exactions law, impact fee
cases continue predictably to address threshold and administrative issues. Colorado's statewide school impact fee may be administered by
individual school districts. The Michigan Supreme Court distinguished
a stormwater regulatory charge as a tax subject to voter approval requirements. Other cases address issues in impact fee administration
including standing, 113 notice of appeal rights, 114 and refunds. 115
107. !d. at 983-1018.
108. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1016.
109. /d.
110. !d. at 1040.
111. /d. at 1047.
112. /d.
113. See, e.g., Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 977 S.W.2d 225,227-28 (Ark. 1998)
(affirming dismissal of challenge to city's sanitation charge based on claim of contract);
Building Industry Ass'n v. Mannheim Township, 710 A.2d 141, 147 (Pa. Cmmwth.
1998) (Building Association lacked standing to seek refund of impact fees paid by its
members).
114. See St. Charles Assocs. v. County Comm'rs, 1998 Md. Tax LEXIS 3 (Md. Tax
Ct. 1998) (remanding impact fee assessment notice that did not indicate process for
appeals).
115. See id. at *1-2; Building Industry Ass'n, 710 A.2d at 147.
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The Colorado Supreme Court sustained a constitutional amendment
establishing a statewide school impact fee against a single-subject state
constitutional challenge.I 16 Under this new provision, local school districts may implement the fee of up to $7,500 per newly constructed
housing unit through initiative or referendum. Collected funds are required to be "used for public school facilities necessitated by the increased student population .... " 117
Michigan's Supreme Court proposed a strict standard for permissible
regulatory charges:
Where the charge for either storm or sanitary sewers reflects the actual costs of use,
metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology, including
some capital investment component, sewerage may properly be viewed as a utility
service for which usage-based charges are permissible, and not as a disguised
tax .... 118

The court found that while the charge would be applied equally to
all ratepayers, 75 percent were already served by a separated storm and
sanitary sewer system, many of which were financed through special
assessments. 119 Under Michigan law, the court concluded that this was
"an investment in infrastructure as opposed to a fee designed simply to
defray the costs of a regulatory activity." 120 Once characterized as a tax
rather than regulation, the stormwater charge could not be enacted without prior voter approval. 121
IV. Concluding Observations

As the litigation record in Del Monte Dunes indicates, the initiative to
extend the constitutional meaning and effect of the Takings Clause can
originate in the lower federal courts without suggestion from the parties
themselves. These doctrinal extensions make it possible for a federal
judge or a jury to weigh the constitutionality of land-use regulatory
actions under the Takings Clause while using due process concepts.
Such possibilities of federal court intervention become even more disturbing to state and local government when the constitutionally mandated compensation remedy of the Takings Clause is considered. Even
in the heyday of substantive due process judicial review symbolized by
Lochnerv. New York, 122 the federal courts could only invalidate state legis116. Howes v. Hayes, 962 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1998).
117. /d. at 928.
118. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998), reh'g denied, 459
Mich. 1233 (1999).
119. /d. at 266.
120. /d. at 270.
121. /d. at 266, 268-74.
122. 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating state labor law limiting work week to
sixty hours on due process grounds).
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lation. The Del Monte Dunes case sets the stage for even more sweeping
court review under the Takings Clause as interpreted by juries.
The Supreme Court's decision not to extend Dolan rough proportionality analysis into review of regulatory discretion denying a development permit has been heralded as a victory for land-use control agencies. Rejection of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a novel, unargued
constitutional rule may also send a thwarting message toward judicial
activism in the lower federal courts. However, the Del Monte Dunes
decision clearly opens the door in property-based civil rights actions
for takings and substantive due process claims emanating from development denials. Furthermore, the Court has already ruled in Dolan that
"disproportionate" land-use conditions may be invalidated. Any of
these regulatory challenges could reach a federal or state jury if they
survive preliminary challenges as takings cases with potentially serious
compensation at issue. These are all potential consequences of implementing the Agins definition of an unconstitutional taking by way of §
1983 and constitutional actions.
Thus, the millennium brings an era of jury empowerment to determine legitimacy of governmental purpose, reasonable relationships between regulatory intent and individual development conditions or denials, and valuations for compensatory takings. Inquiries into whether
a regulated landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use
involves such quantitative analysis, doctrinal inquiries, and discernment that Professor Haar has compared them to the physicist's search
for the quark. 123 Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that this task presents juries with a "more difficult question." 124 Future cases will determine the wisdom of extending jury resolution of these complex landuse issues. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will also clarify the confusing
overlap between the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth and for once explain why the Constitution mandates that a violation of substantive due process must be
remedied by Fifth Amendment compensation.

123. See Williamson County Reg'! Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 199 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
650 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far
that it becomes, literally or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called the 'lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark.' C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d
ed. 1976)." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199, n.l7.
124. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1644.

